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Fish sentience, consciousness, and AI
Commentary on Sneddon et al. on Sentience Denial
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Abstract: The systematic criticism of articles providing evidence that fish and invertebrates can
feel pain is discussed. Beliefs are known to be stronger than evidence in the human mind, and
could generate this outcry, while from another perspective, the criticisms appear as a territorial
move by fishermen against a perceived threat to their domain. The scientific inconsistency in
which consciousness is granted to machines but not to fish and invertebrates, purely due to
political bias, is pointed out. No basis exists for denying sentience to any life form as long as science
is ignorant of the nature and source of consciousness.

Ila France Porcher is an ethologist and
the only researcher to have studied the
behaviour of the individuals of a
community of reef sharks through
underwater observation long term,
finding both cognition and suffering.
She wrote The True Nature of Sharks.
ilafranceporcher.wixsite.com/author

Sneddon et al.’s (2018) target article is important because it directly addresses the refusal of
fishing interests to accept the evidence that fish — and other marine animals assumed to be
“low” — feel pain and suffer. Given the descriptions of the systematic criticisms of each study
published to scientifically establish fish sensitivity to pain, it appears that no matter what
evidence is presented, it will be argued against, even to the extent of twisting experimental
results, as Rose (2014) has repeatedly done when discussing Sneddon’s evidence.
Kahan and his team (2013), researchers at Yale, found that beliefs are stronger than
scientific findings in the human mind. Where a strong belief is held, the believer will use available
evidence to support it, rather than changing his belief to accord with the evidence. This is just as
true of scientists. Fishermen’s persistent anthropocentric arguments against fishes' suffering, in
spite of all evidence to the contrary, appear to be examples of this phenomenon. The cherry
picking of the evidence and rhetorical nature of their arguments are typical signs. Unfortunately,
as Sneddon et al. have stated, by “muddying the waters,” these critics are delaying measures that
should be taken for fish welfare.
The idea that fish do not feel pain comes from the mass of information, called doxa, that
is believed and perpetuated by the populace, but that is not underpinned by empirical evidence.
For centuries, society has reflected the teaching that animals are here exclusively for its use and
has treated them as objects without concern for their lives. So fishermen, who have been yanking
fish around by their hooks since they were children, feel that they are right and that anyone who
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disagrees is wrong. If they cannot find fault with the evidence, they will target the experiment or
the researcher, or resort to personal attacks and the use of denigrating terms such as “anti-fishing
activist.”
In the past, fishermen and the multi-billion-dollar fisheries industry, with all of their
dogmas and jargon, have exercised full control not only of fish, but of how they are perceived in
the minds of the public. So their efforts to debunk the evidence of sentience in their target
animals have the feel of a territorial move against a perceived threat to their dominion. Therefore,
this type of criticism is unlikely to stop.
It has never been scientifically established that fish cannot feel pain, and there is no
reason to assume that they do not. Indeed, the evolution of a host of oceanic stingers has
depended precisely upon their sensitivity to pain, and cognitive evidence shows that their
subjective experiences cannot be as rudimentary as Rose and his co-authors maintain (Bshary et
al. 2002). They assume that subjective states, including pain, are dependent on the complex
human brain. But not only has this not been proven, there is no empirical evidence that such is
the case.
As long as no branch of science understands the nature and source of consciousness, no
basis exists for denying it to any life form. Consciousness researcher and mathematical physicist,
Penrose (1989, 2004a, b), postulates that conscious awareness involves quantum mechanical
phenomena and that all life forms might well be conscious in their way. Further, like many other
things in reality, consciousness does not involve computations — it has the quality of being noncomputational — so no computer will ever be conscious, no matter how big, fast, or complex it
might be. Could an animal be using computations to deal with a non-computational reality?
Natural selection would have eliminated each one the first time it made a mistake.
The popularity of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has served to amplify the idea that animals are
machines. Some arguments against fish sentience actually use the word “robot” to refer to them
(Chella 2016). Fishermen will even say that though fish act like they feel pain, they don't really.
But by definition, a machine cannot act “as if” it can think and feel — this argument requires that
the alleged machine imitate consciousness on cue.
Yet, while sentience is being denied to fish, some thinkers have been willing to accept the
idea that a thermostat is conscious (Dennett 1971), and the conjecture that machines will soon
outdo human thinking has been held to be true since the 1960s, although no evidence has been
found to support it. This curious case of cognitive dissonance in science originates from a second
major consciousness theory which holds that after a certain level of complexity is reached,
consciousness emerges naturally, as in the human brain. This theory supports AI as well as the
arguments against fish sentience that depend on brain comparisons, but it has been criticized for
predicting consciousness where it could not arise. Scientific ignorance about consciousness
underlies AI (Dehaene et al. 2017), just as it underlies the bias against fish and invertebrates.
For every time it has been examined, evidence of sentience has been found in animals
from insects to sharks to elephants. Even the paramecium, a single-celled animal, presents a set
of preferences indicating learning and memory (Armus et al. 2006). Recent studies have
demonstrated that plants show the ability to learn and remember (Gagliano 2014); and amoebas
have demonstrated abilities that have been considered until now to depend on brain circuitry
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(Reid et al. 2012). Awareness in these life forms indicates that the capacity for consciousness does
not depend on the human brain. Indeed, such findings suggest that it might have other roots.
The evidence indicates that we live on a planet alive with conscious life forms, in spite of
what we have been taught. I commend Sneddon et al. for speaking up against industry and fishing
doxa in the effort to establish the truth and continue the work of building a moral society.
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UQAM/ISC Cognitive Science Summer School June 26-July 6 2018, Montreal, Canada

The Other Minds Problem: Animal Sentience and Cognition
Overview. Since Descartes, philosophers know there is no way to know for sure what — or whether — others feel (not even
if they tell you). Science, however, is not about certainty but about probability and evidence. The 7.5 billion individual
members of the human species can tell us what they are feeling. But there are 9 million other species on the planet (20
quintillion individuals), from microbes to mammals, with which humans share biological and cognitive ancestry, but not one
other species can speak: Which of them can feel — and what do they feel? Their human spokespersons — the comparative
psychologists, ethologists, evolutionists, and cognitive neurobiologists who are the world’s leading experts in “mind-reading"
other species -- will provide a sweeping panorama of what it feels like to be an elephant, ape, whale, cow, pig, dog, chicken,
mouse, fish, lizard, lobster, snail: This growing body of facts about nonhuman sentience has profound implications not only
for our understanding of human cognition, but for our treatment of other sentient species.
Gregory Berns: Decoding the dog's mind with awake
neuroimaging
Gordon Burghardt: Probing the Umwelt of Reptiles
Jon Sakata: Audience effects on communication signals
PANEL: Reptiles, Birds and Mammals
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Sarah Brosnan: How do primates feel about their social
partners?
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small nervous system
PANEL: Primates, Voles and Worms
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Simon Reader: Animal social learning: Implications for
understanding others
PANEL: Sea to Land to Air
WORKSHOP: Steven M. Wise: Nonhuman personhood
Tomoko Ohyama: Action selection in a small brain
(Drosophila maggot)
Mike Ryan: "Crazy love" - nonlinearity and irrationality
in mate choice
Louis Lefebvre: Animal innovation: from ecology to
neurotransmitters
PANEL: Maggots, Frogs and Birds: Flexibility Evolving
SPECIAL EVENT: Mario Cyr: Polar Bears
Colin Chapman: Why Do We Want to Think People Are
Different?
Vladimir Pradosudov: Chickadee spatial cognition
Jonathan Balcombe: The sentient world of fishes
PANEL: Similarities and Differences
WORKSHOP (part 1): Gary Comstock: A Cow's Concept
of Her Future
WORKSHOP (part 2): Jean-Jacques Kona-Boun: Physical
and Mental Risks to Cattle and Horses in Rodeos

Joshua Plotnik: Thoughtful trunks: Application of
elephant cognition for elephant conservation
Lori Marino: Who cetaceans are
PANEL: Mammals All, Great and Small
Larry Young: The neurobiology of social bonding,
empathy and social loss in monogamous voles
WORKSHOP: Lori Marino: The Inconvenient Truth
About Thinking Chickens
Andrew Adamatzky: Slime mould: cognition through
computation
Frantisek Baluska & Stefano Mancuso: What a Plant
Knows and Perceives
Arthur Reber: A novel theory of the origin of mind:
Conversations with a caterpillar and a bacterium
PANEL: Microbes, Molds and Plants
WORKSHOP: Suzanne Held & Michael Mendl: Pig
Cognition and Why It Matters
James Simmons: What is it like to be a bat?
Debbie Kelly: Spatial cognition in Food-Storing
Steve Phelps: Social Cognition across species
PANEL
WORKSHOP: To be announced
Lars Chittka: The Mind of the Bee
Reuven Dukas: Insect emotions: mechanisms and
evolutionary biology
Adam Shriver: Do Human Lesion Studies Tell Us the
Cortex is Required for Pain Experiences?
PANEL
WORKSHOP: The Legal Status of Sentient Nonhuman
Species
Carel ten Cate: Avian capacity for categorization and
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PANEL
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4

